Network coding allows to increase the throughput as well as the robustness of data transmissions. Regarding robustness, especially rateless network coding was shown to be beneficial. However, the vulnerability of mere network coding against attacks requires introducing security mechanisms, and as known, security implies costs. Within this paper, we evaluate the efficiency of secure network coding schemes applied in a rateless manner. Our results show that secure rateless network coding schemes can still outperform routing. The actual efficiency depends on parameters like generation size, packet size, or network topology. Since conflicting efficiency parameters cannot be fulfilled in equal measure, selection of a secure network coding scheme and its parameters should be done adapted to the actual communication requirements.
Introduction
Network coding [1] is a promising approach for increasing throughput, energy efficiency, and robustness of data transmission, hence, its use in various contexts was investigated [2] [3] [4] . In contrast to common routing, nodes in the network do not only forward data packets, rather, they compute linear combinations of the data packets they receive. Usually, data to be transmitted is organized in generations [2] . If the size of the generation equals the network capacity, the whole generation can be transmitted at once from the sender (source) to the recipients (sinks).
In the rateless scenario, the sender sends linear combinations computed from the data packets of one generation until he gets acknowledgments from all recipients. Possibilities for rateless network coding and for managing this feedback have been studied, e.g., in [5] [6] [7] ; but these studies do not focus on secure network coding schemes.
However, the vulnerability of network coding against various passive as well as active attacks requires introducing security mechanisms. Since especially the pollution of data packets is critical due to its damaging influence on the subsequent processing, we focus on schemes providing security against this type of attack. Numerous approaches for detecting polluted packets have been published. Of course, security increases costs, e.g., in terms of communication or computation overhead. To the best of our knowledge, the existing evaluations of the performance of rateless network coding do not explicitly consider secure network coding schemes.
The contribution of this paper is to provide results regarding the efficiency of selected secure network coding schemes applied in a rateless manner. Particularly, we consider the dependency of efficiency parameters on the generation size, packet size, and network topology. Our results indicate that rateless network coding still provides benefits if security mechanisms are introduced. Since the efficiency parameters may be contradictory, selecting a network coding approach and setting the necessary parameters should be done adaptively.
The paper is organized as follows. The selected network coding schemes are sketched in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the test settings and experiments. Subsequently, the results of the experiments are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes and gives an outlook.
Selected approaches for secure network coding
The common notation of network coding is based on a directed, acyclic graph G = (V, E) with a set of nodes (vertices) V and a set of links (edges) E. In the multicast scenario also considered in this paper, a sender S ∈ V transmits data packets over forwarders F i ∈ V to a number of recipients R i ∈ V (Fig. 1) . The forwarders compute linear combinations from the data packets x i = (x i,1 , x i,2 , ..., x i,n ) ∈ F n q they receive over their l incoming edges
and send these combinations over their outgoing edges to successive nodes. The recipients can decode the original data by solving a system of linear equations once they received a sufficient number of linear independent data packets.
In random linear network coding (RLNC), the nodes randomly select the linear coefficients α i ∈ F q . The approaches we have selected for our evaluations are based on Practical Network Coding (PNC, introduced in [2] ), a practical implementation of RLNC. In PNC, data to be sent is divided into data packets
These data packets are amended by a unit vector (β i,1 , β i,2 , ..., β i,h ) ∈ F h q that represents the global encoding vector GEV. The resulting data packets of n = h + m symbols are organized in matrices called generations. Only data packets from one generation can be combined. Therefore, data packets are tagged with a generation identifier gid that needs to be unique within the system. One generation contains h data packets, hence, h represents the generation size.
The network capacity C (max-flow min-cut, [1] ) represents the amount of data that can be transmitted to the recipients at once in the multicast scenario. In rateless network coding, the sender sends data packets until he gets acknowledgments from all recipients confirming the successful delivery of the data packets. In this scenario, the generation size can be chosen independent from the network capacity. The generation size obviously influences the efficiency of network coding, e.g., while a larger generation size increases the throughput, it also increases the decoding delay [5] .
Since network coding in its basic form is vulnerable against attacks, the introduction of security mechanisms have to be considered. Pollution attacks are especially critical since polluted packets that are included into the linear combinations influence the whole subsequent processing and may prevent decoding in the worst case. Hence, various approaches have been introduced in the literature that aim at preventing the success of such pollution attacks.
Within this paper, we focus on approaches based on cryptography that enable intermediate nodes in the network to detect and discard polluted data packets that do not belong to the linear span of the valid data packets. Generally, the sender computes information necessary for verifying the validity of the data packets. For our evaluations, we selected four schemes that represent different approaches (for more details, we refer to the cited articles as well as [8] ):
Homomorphic hashes (HH): As an example, we selected the approach introduced by Li et al. [9] . The sender computes hash values for all packets of the generations to be sent during a session with session identifier sid. The authenticity of the hash values is ensured by means of digital signatures. Due to the homomorphic property, intermediate nodes can check the validity of received packets by comparing the hash for the combined data packets to the combination of the original hash values.
Homomorphic signatures (HS):
The sender computes one homomorphic signature for each data packet. The signatures are included in the data packets. Since they are homomorphic, a valid signature for a combined data packet can be computed by appropriately combining the signatures of the corresponding data packets. As an example, we selected the scheme introduced by Catalano et al. [10] . In that scheme, homomorphic signatures are computed over bilinear groups.
Homomorphic MACs (Message Authentication Codes; HM):
This approach is based on symmetric cryptography, i.e., sender and verifying nodes must share a key. In the selected approach [11] , the sender computes a number of MACs for each data packet. The number of MACs per packet depends on the length T of the maximum path between sender and recipient. The sender first generates a chain of seed values and sends the digitally signed last values of this chain, the chain commitment b c , to the verifying nodes. These seeds are used to derive the symmetric keys for computing the MACs. After sending data packets, the sender also successively sends the seeds. A verifying node checks the authenticity of the seeds by means of the signed chain commitment, derives the symmetric key and checks the last MAC of the data packet. In case of a successful verification, this MAC is removed; i.e, the number k of MACs per data packet decreases. After this step, data packets as well as homomorphic MACs are linearly combined and sent to subsequent nodes.
Authenticated Checksums (DART):
The basic idea is that the verification information is sent after the data packets have been received. In the selected example introduced in [12] , the sender periodically computes and distributes checksums that are also homomorphic. The forwarders have to store data packets until they get a digitally signed checksum sent after they received the data packet. A combined packet is valid if the checksum for this packet equals the result of applying the linear combinations to the checksum sent by the sender.
Except HM, these secure network coding schemes can be used in a rateless manner without modifications. The problem for HM is that seeds once published are no longer secret, i.e, they cannot be used again. To enable verification of all messages of a generation, we introduced batches for a generation. The size of a batch equals the number of outgoing edges of the sender. For each batch with identifier bid, the sender computes MACs using fresh keys based on one chain that must now contain more values. Thus, the signed chain commitment b c has to be sent only once.
The selected network coding schemes were compared to routing the data packets applying a sliding window approach (RT, [13] ) and to network coding without security measures (PNC, [2] ). RT does not contain security measures, hence, the efficiency parameters for this approach mainly serve as a comparison to PNC.
Evaluations

Simulation Environment and Assumptions Regarding the Schemes
Implementing the selected schemes requires defining a packet format and the size of the data fields (Tab. 1). The size of the underlying finite field F q , q = 2 σ was set according to the size suggested by the authors of the schemes. This parameter determines the symbol size σ of encoding coefficients and data symbols. Regarding the size of the cryptographically computed information, we followed suggestions by NIST to ensure a similar security level for the schemes [14] . If the verification information is directly contained in the data packet, the size of this value is given in the last column. The packet format should allow using different schemes. Hence, forwarding nodes as well as recipients must be able to recognize the selected scheme and relevant parameters. Consequently, all data packets contain a field type (1 byte) that encodes the selected scheme. Additionally, the data packets contain parameters required by the schemes (e.g., security parameters) or necessary for an implementation (e.g., the number of packets per generation h). Since it is not possible to discuss these specific parameters in detail, we summarized them with param in Tab. 1. Data packets for RT just contain the type, a packet identifier, the number of data symbols and the data symbols with σ = 8 bit.
The selected approaches for secure network coding were implemented based on the network simulation framework ns-3 [15] . The network coding functionality was implemented using the C++ library NTL [16] that provides functionality for efficient computations in finite fields. Furthermore, the library PBC [17] was used for computations based on elliptic curves applied in HS. Digital signatures were computed by means of RSA as provided in OpenSSL [18] .
Efficiency Parameters and Experiments
For evaluating the efficiency of the secure network coding schemes in the rateless scenario, we measured multiple parameters. Within this paper, we present results for parameters that correlate to the delay and the energy consumption:
• The throughput reflects the data rate and is computed as ratio of payload to transmission time.
• The relative payload equals the ratio of payload to the overall data to be sent (including, e.g., encoding coefficients and digital signatures). If data are transmitted multiple times, they are considered as redundant data. A high relative payload allows for a high throughput.
• The number of send operations reflects the number of data packets to be sent in the whole network by the sender as well as by the forwarders. Such a value is especially of interest if we consider the energy consumption per send operation.
• The decoding delay represents the transmission time of a whole generation, i.e., the time to transmit enough linear independent data packets to the recipients so that they could start to decode by solving the system of linear equations. Computation time needed for decoding is not included.
These efficiency parameters were determined for the selected schemes considering different conditions (selected results are presented in Sec. 4):
Influence of generation size. In the first series of tests, we evaluated the dependence of the efficiency parameters on the generation size. For the corresponding simulation runs, we worked with network model 1 (Fig. 1a) Influence of packet size. The packet size obviously influences the payload per packet, hence, it also influences the number of send operations and the throughput. The goal of the second series of tests was to determine concrete values for this dependency. Again, we worked with network model 1 (Fig. 1a) . The efficiency parameters have been evaluated for sending 100 kByte data using a packet size of 700 byte and for sending 400 kByte data using a packet size of 2800 byte.
Influence of network topology. The influence of the network topology was studied by varying (1) the number of hops between sender and recipients, and (2) the network capacity. For the first issue, network model 2 was used (Fig. 1b) . In these experiments, 200 kByte data was sent using a packet size of 1400 byte, and the path length was varied between 2 and 16. To focus on the influence of the path length, the generation size was set to the most efficient value according to the results of the first series of tests. Increasing the network capacity will improve the efficiency of network coding. For evaluating the influence of this parameter, we evaluated sending 200 kByte of data considering network model 3 (Fig. 1c) that provides a network capacity of C = 4 and compared the results to the results using model 1 with C = 2.
Results
Influence of Generation Size
At first, raising the generation size increases the relative payload for all schemes (Fig 2a) . The sender sends data packets until he gets acknowledgements. Sending data packets as well as acknowledgements needs some time, hence, the ratio of repeatedly sent data packets decreases with growing generation size. However, for HH, HS, and HM, there is only an increase up to a generation size of 10 or 12, respectively; for larger generations, the relative payload decreases. The number of encoding coefficients depends on the generation size h, and since the symbol size has to be increased for these schemes, the payload per data packet is drastically reduced. Actually, there is a maximum possible generation size of 44 or 41, respectively, for HS and HH. HM provides a higher relative payload than HH and HS, since in contrast to these schemes, the sender can only send until the first seed packet was delivered. Hence, the number of redundant data packets reduces. The number of send operations heavily depends on the relative payload since more packets have to be sent with decreasing payload per data packet (Fig. 2b) . Secure schemes generally need more send operation than RT since additional information has to be sent; only PNC outperforms RT for a generation size of 8 or more.
The throughput also depends on the relative payload (Fig. 2c) . Only results for HM are worse due to the waiting periods. DART outperforms RT for a generation size of 30 or more; the checksum packets are small and do not have such a strong influence. The throughput for HH and HS significantly decreases with increasing generation size due to the drastically reduced payload. Hence, these schemes cannot outperform RT regarding throughput.
The decoding delay generally increases with growing generation size since more data packets have to be sent before decoding can start. The best secure scheme is HS that causes a decoding delay similar to PNC. The other secure schemes imply bigger decoding delays since additional packets have to be sent before or after the data packets. The strongest increase of the decoding delay was measured for HM since a generation was sent in batches and each batch implies waiting periods.
Influence of Packet Size
An increased packet size provides a larger payload per data packet. Especially schemes that require increasing the symbol size benefit from larger packets. Consequently, the throughput is also improved (Fig. 3a, 3b) . The bigger the payload, the more data can be verified. For HM, this benefit cannot be observed since increased packet size also increases the time periods between sending seed packets and, hence, increases waiting periods. A drawback of using a larger packet size is the increased decoding delay (Fig. 3c, 3d ). Of course, sending larger data packets require more time so that recipients have to wait longer until they get enough linear independent data packets. Moreover, the computing time for decoding will also increase.
Influence of Network Topology
Influence of longest path. For these tests, the generation size was set to the most efficient values according to the results of the first experiments: h = 50 (PNC, DART), 12 (HS), 10 (HS), and 6 (HM). The length of the path between sender and recipient determines the transmission time. Since the sender continuously sends until getting acknowledgments in the rateless scenario, there are more redundant data with increasing path length. Consequently, the relative payload decreases (Fig. 4a) . The relative payload of HM additionally decreases since the number of MACs per data packet depends on the length of the path. However, due to the waiting periods, the influence of this effect is moderated.
A longer path increases the number of send operations for all schemes (Fig. 4b) . One reason is that more nodes are involved in the transmission process, and all these nodes have to forward the packets. Additionally, since the acknowledgments are received later, more redundant data packets are sent. Again, this effect is moderated for HM due to the waiting periods. However, if there is a longer path, more seed packets have to be sent and, hence, the number of send operations increases even stronger than for the other schemes. For all schemes except HM, the relative payload has the most significant influence on the throughput (Fig. 4c) . The throughput of HM also decreases if the path gets longer, but the main reason are the high waiting periods for the sender before the next batch can be sent.
The increase of the decoding delay with growing path length is quite moderate for PNC, HH, and HS (Fig. 4d) . However, schemes based on time asymmetry show a significant increase of the decoding delay since there are always waiting periods until a forwarder can verify and further process a data packet. The influence is especially strong for HM, since the sender processes a generation batch by batch.
Influence of network capacity. As expected, a network with a larger network capacity increases the efficiency. The results also show that the generation size should be a multiple of the maximum flow to best utilize the potential benefits. Otherwise, redundant data packets are sent and as a consequence, the relative payload does not increase.
Again, the increased relative payload improves the throughput of the schemes (Fig. 5b ). An exception is HM, caused by the waiting periods. The other schemes can outperform routing given a suitable generation size. While HH and HS are again limited by the significantly increased size of the GEV, DART generally provides a better throughput than RT for a generation size larger than 12.
Conclusion
Our evaluations have shown that rateless secure network coding can still outperform routing even if the rateless mode significantly influences the efficiency of these schemes. An important factor is that some schemes require to increase the symbol size what implies a significantly increase of the GEV. Given a fixed packet size, the relative payload decreases, consequently, also the other efficiency parameters are influenced. However, the results also depend on the network topology -while longer paths between sender and recipient have a negative influence on the efficiency, Figures (2a, 2c) show corresponding results for a network capacity of C = 2.
a higher network capacity improves efficiency. Further, the efficiency can still be influenced by choosing a suitable packet size -taking into account that a larger packet size increases the decoding delay.
To conclude, it is not possible to determine a secure network coding scheme that performs best under all conditions and regarding all efficiency parameters. The scheme and its parameters should be chosen adaptively depending on the application requirements as well as on the network topology. Especially generation size and packet size (if possible) should be set appropriately.
Further work has to be done to consider the efficiency of rateless secure network coding schemes in case of possible attacks. If there is packet loss, redundant packets will improve the efficiency in comparison to routing. Additionally, possibilities for optimizing the network coding schemes should be taken into consideration, like pipelining generations. Finally, recommendations regarding a best suited scheme should also take into account further efficiency parameters or system restrictions, such as memory or computational power.
